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Abstract 
Evidence, such as the content of reports produced by inspectors appointed by the 
Secretary of State for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform under statutory 
powers potentially falls within the ambit of two of the exclusionary rules of evidence, 
namely, the hearsay rule and the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn
1
 (the latter rule, 
essentially, concerns the admissibility of findings made by a court, etc, in subsequent 
proceedings between different parties). Such evidence may, however, be admissible 
both in winding up proceedings and in directors disqualification proceedings under an 
implied statutory exception to both of the abovementioned rules. The implied 
exception appears to be largely, if not wholly, otiose as an exception to the rule 
against hearsay, due to the operation of the general hearsay exception that was created 
by section 1 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995. The implied exception continues to be of 
significance, however, to the extent to which such evidence consists of findings made 
by an inspector appointed by the Secretary of State, etc.  
 
Introduction  
In The Secretary of State for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform v Aaron
2
, 
the Court of Appeal, in the context of directors disqualification, was concerned with 
the admissibility, for the Secretary of State, of evidence including findings and 
opinions in a Financial Services Authority’s report and evidence of decisions made by 
the Financial Ombudsman Service, the relevant evidence comprising both hearsay 
evidence and, in part, evidence of opinion. Their Lordships held that evidence in the 
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Financial Services Authority’s report was admissible under an implied statutory 
exception to the rule against hearsay and the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn
3
 but that 
the evidence of decisions made by the Financial Ombudsman Service, not falling 
within the ambit of the implied exception, was inadmissible to the extent that it 
comprised findings of fact as opposed to mere hearsay evidence. The purpose of this 
article is to consider the nature of this implied exception.  
 
The rule in Hollington v Hewthorn: nature, rationale and ambit 
 
The facts of Hollington‘s case were as follows. A motorist was convicted of careless 
driving following a collision between a car driven by the motorist, which belonged to 
the defendants, and another car, which belonged to the plaintiff and had been driven 
by the plaintiff’s son at the time of the collision. The plaintiff brought civil 
proceedings in negligence against the defendants and, because his son had died prior 
to the civil trial, wished to adduce evidence of the careless driving conviction. The 
Court of Appeal held that evidence of the conviction was inadmissible. The basis of 
their Lordships’ decision was that: the conviction was only evidence that the criminal 
court had considered that the motorist was guilty of the offence of careless driving; 
the issue in the criminal proceedings was not identical with the issue raised in the civil 
proceedings; the opinion of the criminal court (like that of a non-expert witness on an 
ultimate issue) was irrelevant in the context of the civil proceedings; subject to well 
established common law hearsay exceptions and statutory hearsay exceptions (none of 
which were applicable) the death of a witness did not render evidence admissible if 
the evidence would have not have been admissible if the witness had been alive; and 
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(their Lordships adopting the words of De GreyCJ in the Duchess of Kingston’s 
case
4
) it would be unjust to permit a judgment to be used to prejudice a stranger who 
could not enter a defence or examine witnesses in the earlier proceedings and who 
could not appeal against it.  
 
Whilst the decision of the Court of Appeal in Hollington specifically concerned the 
inadmissibility of a previous conviction in subsequent civil proceedings, the courts 
have recognised that the common law rule in Hollington’s case is of more general 
application and encompasses also: the inadmissibility in civil proceedings of findings 
that were made in earlier civil proceedings between different parties
5
; the 
admissibility in criminal proceedings of the verdict of an earlier criminal court
6
; and 
the admissibility in criminal proceedings of findings that were made in previous civil 
proceedings.
7
 The ambit of the common law rule has, however, been reduced by a 
number of statutory provisions.
8
 In the context of civil proceedings, the most 
significant express statutory exception to the rule in Hollington’s case is section 11 of 
the Civil Evidence Act 1968, the effect of which is that relevant and subsisting 
previous convictions (though not foreign convictions) are admissible in civil 
proceedings and give rise to the rebuttable presumption that the person convicted 
committed the offence of which he was convicted.  
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It is important to note that (other than in relation to findings of adultery and 
paternity
9
) the 1968 Act made no provision for the admissibility of previous civil 
judgments in later civil proceedings between different parties as evidence of the facts 
on which the judgments had been founded. This was in line with a recommendation 
made by the Law Reform Committee in their Fifteenth Report.
10
 The basis of the 
Committee’s recommendation was that a party to the later proceedings who had not 
been a party to the earlier proceedings should not be prejudiced by the way in which 
the case of a party to the earlier proceedings had been conducted and that a party to 
both sets of proceedings should be able to improve on the way in which the party’s 
case had been prepared or presented in the context of the earlier proceedings. In 
contrast, the Committee
11
 had recommended that previous domestic convictions 
should be admissible in civil proceedings as evidence that the person convicted was 
guilty of the relevant conduct. The Committee, whilst regarding the opinion of a court 
as being of a different nature to that of a private individual, had distinguished the 
opinions of criminal and civil courts on the basis that a finding of culpability in 
contested criminal proceedings was of higher probative value than one in civil 
proceedings because the standard of proof in criminal proceedings was higher than the 
civil standard, the prosecution were under a duty to adduce or disclose to the defence 
any material that tended to show that the accused was not culpable and the judge was 
under a duty to exclude prosecution evidence the probative value of which was 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 
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The admissibility of hearsay evidence in civil proceedings 
 
Whilst the decision of the Court of Appeal in Aaron was concerned with the operation 
of the implied exception as an exception to the rule in Hollington’s case, it is 
submitted that in the cases in which the existence of the implied exception was 
recognised and in which its rationale and scope were determined, the courts were at 
least primarily concerned with its operation as an exception to the rule against hearsay 
rather than with its role as an exception to the rule in Hollington’s case. Indeed, as is 
demonstrated below, it seems that the rule in Hollington’s case was only referred to 
by the courts in two of the pre-Aaron cases
12
, one of those
13
 being a case to which the 
Court of Appeal in Aaron did not even refer. As is indicated below, however, the 
Court of Appeal in Aaron did regard several of the winding up cases in which 
Hollington was not referred to as providing authority for the proposition that the 
implied exception encompasses not merely hearsay evidence but also evidence of 
findings and opinions and also regarded the courts in directors disqualification cases 
in which Hollington was not referred to as having approved the approach of the courts 
in the winding up cases.  
 
The role of the implied exception as an exception to the rule against hearsay was of 
fundamental importance until January 1997, when the Civil Evidence Act 1995 came 
into force,
14
 the effect of section 1 of the 1995 Act being that evidence will not be 
excluded in civil proceedings on the ground that it is hearsay evidence. Thus, as the 
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courts have recognised in directors disqualification cases including Aaron itself
15
, 
once section 1 of the 1995 Act came into force, the mere fact that evidence fell within 
the ambit of the hearsay rule no longer prevented its admission in evidence either in 
winding up proceedings or in directors disqualification proceedings. The effect of 
section 14(1) of the 1995 Act is, however, that the Act does not prevent the exclusion 
of evidence on grounds other than its hearsay nature. Thus, since (as was 
demonstrated above) the existence of the rule in Hollington’s case was not justified 
solely upon the basis of the hearsay nature of previous findings but, rather, was also 
justified upon the basis that such findings merely amount to the opinion of the earlier 
court, inspector, etc, it is submitted that section 1 of the 1995 Act does not render 
hearsay evidence admissible to the extent to which such evidence falls within the 
ambit of the rule in Hollington’s case.  
 
Whilst the role of the implied exception as an exception to the rule against hearsay in 
winding up and directors disqualification proceedings now appears to be superfluous, 
it is submitted that, technically at least, a distinction may be drawn between hearsay 
evidence that is admissible under the implied exception and hearsay evidence that is 
only admissible under section 1 of the 1995 Act. The basis of this distinction is that 
the effect of section 1(4) is that where hearsay evidence is admissible other than under 
section 1 (e.g. under some other statutory provision or under a preserved common law 
hearsay exception) the safeguards and supplementary provisions created by sections 2 
to 6(which do apply where hearsay is admissible solely under section 1) do not apply. 
Thus, it is submitted that where hearsay evidence is admissible in civil proceedings 
under the implied exception, the safeguards and supplementary provisions contained 
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in sections 2-6 of the 1995 Act are not applicable. Thus, for example, whilst under 
rules of court made under section 3 of the 1995 Act
16
 a party to civil proceedings can 
apply for leave to call the maker of a hearsay statement for cross-examination, it is 
submitted that this safeguard does not apply to hearsay evidence that falls within the 
ambit of the implied exception. 
 
The relevant winding up and directors disqualification legislation 
 
Section 124A of the  Insolvency Act 1986 (which is derived from section 35 of the 
Companies Act 1972 which has itself replaced s.169(3) of the Companies Act 1948) 
provides that the Secretary of State may petition the court that a company be wound 
up, where it is thought expedient in the public interest. The evidence that may be 
relied upon by the Secretary of State in reaching this conclusion includes, for 
example, any report or information obtained under Part XIV of the Companies Act 
1985 (excepting section 448A – protection in relation to breach of confidence 
following disclosure) and reports provided under provisions of the Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000.  The court is petitioned to order the winding up of the 
company on the ground that it is just and equitable to do so.   
 
Under Part XIV of the Companies Act 1985, inspectors may be appointed by the 
Secretary of State to investigate the affairs of a company and produce a report 
following an application from the company itself or its members (the latter subject to 
a threshold in terms of the number of members required to make the application)
17
; 
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following an order of the court to this effect
18
 or if it appears to the Secretary of State 
that there is actual or proposed fraudulent or unfairly prejudicial conduct of the 
company’s affairs, that the company was formed for a fraudulent purpose or that the 




Following the appointment of inspectors under either section 431 or 432 of the 
Companies Act 1985, officers and agents of the company are required to produce 
relevant documents, attend before the inspectors if required and generally assist them 
in their investigations
20
.  The inspectors may examine any person under oath for the 
purposes of their investigation
21
   and must make a final report to the Secretary of 
State on the conclusion of their investigation
22
.  A copy of the inspectors report must 
be sent to the court if the inspectors were appointed following a court order
23
. The 
Secretary of State may publish the report and may, on request, send a copy of the 
report (amongst others) to any member or creditor of the company and anyone whose 




Any answer given to a question put as part of an investigation under sections 431 and 
432 may be used in evidence against the individual concerned, subject to an exception 
relating to criminal proceedings where the answer can only be used by the prosecution 
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A copy of the inspectors report that has been certified as a true copy by the Secretary 
of State is admissible in any legal proceedings as evidence of the inspectors’ opinions 
on any matters stated therein and, for the purposes of directors disqualification 
proceedings under section 8 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 




Section 447 of the Companies Act 1985 allows the Secretary of State to give 
directions requiring a company to produce specified documents and information or to 
authorise an investigator to make the above requirements
27
.   Any statement made in 
compliance with these requirements may be used in evidence against the person 
making it, subject to an exception relating to criminal proceedings where the 
statement can only be used by the prosecution if evidence relating to it is used by the 
defence
28
.  This type of investigation is usually undertaken by the Companies 
Investigation Branch of BERR and is a more low key affair to the full blown and 
sometimes lengthy investigations conducted by inspectors appointed under section 
431 or 432, where the companies involved tend to be plc’s and the subject matter of 
the enquiry of significant public interest.  
 
Investigations into the conduct of a company’s business, or in relation to breaches of 
particular Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 provisions, may be carried out 
under sections 167 or 168 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. Under 
section 167,  investigators may be appointed if it appears to the “investigating 
authority” that there is good reason for doing so29.  An investigator appointed under 
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sections 167 or  168 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 must make a report of 
his investigation to the investigating authority
30. The phrase “investigating authority” 




Under section 8 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, the Secretary of 
State may apply to the court for a disqualification order against a director if thought 
expedient in the public interest to do so following consideration of investigative 
material
32
. Investigative material in this context includes, for example, inspectors 
reports made under section 437 Companies Act 1985 (which would cover reports 
prepared following application under section 431 or following court order or decision 
of the Secretary of State under section 432), information or documents obtained under 
section 447 Companies Act 1985
33
 and reports provided under provisions of the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. 
 
Under section 7 of the 1986 Act, the Secretary of State (in the context of determining 
whether to apply for a disqualification order) may require an office holder (liquidator, 
administrator or administrative receiver) to furnish him with information relating to a 
person’s conduct as a director and produce/permit inspection of records relevant to 
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The implied exception: nature, development and scope (the winding up 
cases and Gasco) 
 
As early as 1897, in In re Grosvenor and West End Railway Terminus Hotel Co Ltd
34
 
the Court of Appeal was required to consider the admissibility in civil proceedings of 
a report of inspectors appointed by the Board of Trade to conduct an examination into 
the affairs of a company. The inspectors had been appointed under section 56 of the 
Companies Act 1862, section 59 of the Act requiring the inspectors to report their 
opinion to the Board and section 61 rendering a copy of their report admissible in 
legal proceedings as evidence of their opinion. Their Lordships held that the report 
was not evidence of its factual content but was merely evidence of the inspector’s 
opinion. In coming to this conclusion, their Lordships recognised that, under the 
scheme of the 1862 Act, the board was not empowered to do anything on receipt of 
the report. 
 
In 1962, Buckley J, in In re ABC Coupler and Engineering Company Ltd
35
, was 
required to consider the admissibility of reports produced by inspectors appointed by 
the Board of Trade under section 165 of the Companies Act 1948 to investigate and 
report on the affairs of three companies. The issue arose in the context of a petition to 
wind up a company which the Board had presented under section 169(3). The report 
had been exhibited to the affidavit of a Board of Trade official, the company relying 
on the affidavit of a director. His Lordship held that, in the circumstances, the 
evidence on which the Board had relied was not sufficient to persuade him to exercise 
his discretion so as to make a winding-up order. In reaching this decision, his 
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Lordship did not, however, exclude the possibility that the court might be prepared to 
make a winding up order on the basis of hearsay evidence in circumstances in which 
such evidence was the only evidence that the petitioner had available.  
 
In March 1967, in Re Travel and Holiday Club
36
, the Board of Trade presented a 
petition to wind up a company under section 169(3) of the 1948 Act. The report of 
inspectors who had been appointed by the Board under section 165 was exhibited to 
their affidavit. The company did not appear, did not adduce any evidence and did not 
address any arguments to the court. Pennycuick J, declining to follow the decision of 
Buckley J in the ABC case, held that, upon a proper construction of section 169(3), he 
was entitled to rely upon the findings in the inspectors’ report and, on the basis of 
those findings, was entitled to make a winding up order in the absence of any other 
evidence. The basis of his Lordship’s decision was, essentially, that the intention of 
the section was that the court was entitled to consider and act upon the report of 
inspectors appointed under the 1948 Act unless the report was challenged by evidence 
adduced by the company.  
 
In April 1967, Pennycuick J, in In re SBA Properties Ltd
37
, followed his earlier 
decision in the Travel and Holiday Club case. In reaching his decision, his Lordship 
distinguishing the decision of the Court of Appeal in Grosvenor upon the basis that 
the 1862 Act, unlike the 1948 Act, had not empowered the Board of Trade to take any 
steps in consequence of the inspectors’ report and, in particular, had not empowered 
the Board to present a petition to wind up a company upon the basis of such a report.  
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In July 1967, in In re Allied Produce Co Ltd
38
, Buckley J was provided with an 
opportunity to explain his decision in the ABC case, which his Lordship distinguished, 
his Lordship applying the decisions of Pennycuick J in the Travel and Holiday Club 
and SBA cases. His Lordship distinguished the facts of ABC from those of Travel and 
Holiday Club and SBA upon the basis that in ABC the company had appeared and had 
been supported by creditors whereas in the latter cases the companies had not 
appeared. His Lordship indicated that the basis of his decision in ABC had been that 
hearsay evidence would not suffice where the allegations upon which the petition was 
based were contentions.  
 
In 1972, in the context of two winding up petitions which had been filed by the 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Megarry J, in Re Koscot Interplanetary 
(UK) Ltd
39
, was required to consider the admissibility of material that had originated 
in the United States of America. The material, exhibited to the affidavit of a 
Department of Trade and Industry official, comprised a letter from an attorney in the 
Bureau of Consumer Protection in the Federal Trade Commission of Washington DC 
and a document forming part of a report by the Council of Better Business Bureaus 
Inc which the attorney had also provided. His Lordship held that the letter and the 
document were both inadmissible. In the course of reaching his decision, his Lordship 
considered the ABC, Travel and Holiday Club, SBA and Allied Produce cases but held 
that whilst these authorities had established that inspectors reports made under the 
1948 Act had a “special status”, there was nothing in these authorities that supported 
the view that there was an “open licence” to admit hearsay in winding up cases.  
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In 1975, in In Re Armvent 
40
, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, having 
received a report from inspectors appointed under s.165 of the 1948 Act, presented a 
petition to wind up a company, the report being exhibited to the affidavit of a 
Department of Trade official. The petition was opposed but no evidence was given to 
challenge the material parts of the report. Templeman J, having read the report, made 
the winding up order. In reaching his decision, his Lordship, relying upon the decision 
of Pennycuick J in the Travel and Holiday Club case and referring also to the 
decisions in SBA, Allied Produce and Koscot, understood the reluctance of a court to 
rely on a report in the absence of other evidence in circumstances in which the 
conclusions in the report were challenged by other evidence but held that since the 
report had not been challenged, his Lordship was entitled to regard it as prima facie 
evidence of the conclusions that the inspectors had drawn. Indeed, his Lordship was 
of the view that even where a report was challenged, the report should still be treated 
as prima facie evidence of the inspectors’ conclusions, it being for the court to 
determine on the basis of the report and the other evidence before it whether the 
winding up of the company was just and equitable. His Lordship recognised that the 
inspectors’ report “machinery” had been “evolved” to enable the Secretary of State to 
present a petition where this was in the public interest, his Lordship indicating that it 
would have been “unfortunate” if the court had been required to proceed as though no 
inspectors had been appointed.   
 
In 1981, Dillon J, in In re St. Piran Ltd
41
, was required to consider a petition to wind 
up a company which had been presented by another company (which held shares in 
the former company) as a contributory. The Secretary of State for Trade had 
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previously appointed inspectors to investigate the affairs of the former company, 
under sections 165 and 172 of the 1948 Act but, whilst the inspectors had invited the 
Secretary of State to petition the court under section 35 of the Companies Act 1972 
(which had replaced s.169(3) of the 1948 Act) the Secretary of State had declined to 
do so. The petition that the latter company had presented was, however, largely based 
on the inspectors’ report. One of the issues that Dillon J was required to determine in 
St Piran was whether it was only the Secretary of State who was entitled to rely on 
the findings in an inspectors’ report in support of a petition or whether other 
petitioners, suing as creditors or contributories, were entitled to do so. His Lordship, 
with reference to the Travel and Holiday Club and SBA cases, held that the petitioner 
had been entitled to rely upon the report. The basis of his Lordship’s decision was that 
even though the Secretary of State had not presented a petition, the inspectors had still 
been acting in a statutory capacity. His Lordship recognised that inspectors are not 
only appointed in order that the Secretary of State can protect the public interest but 
may also be appointed to protect the interests of minority shareholders, his Lordship 
indicating that it would largely defeat the object of the inspectors’ inquiry if the 
inspectors’ report could not be relied upon where a petition was presented by a 
minority shareholder. In relation to those circumstances in which the findings in an 
inspectors’ report are challenged by evidence adduced on behalf of the company, his 
Lordship, having considered the relevant aspects of the decisions in Travel and 
Holiday Club and Armvent, recognised that where such evidence is adduced, the 
judge, prior to deciding whether to make a winding up order, should consider all of 
the material before the court, including the inspectors’ report. His Lordship also 
indicated, however, that where a company does not file evidence to challenge a report, 
the company may still assert that even if the inspectors’ findings are correct, the 
findings are not sufficient to persuade the court that the winding up of the company is 
just and equitable.  
 
Finally, in 1983, in Savings & Investment Bank Ltd. v Gasco Investments 
(Netherlands) BV
42
, Peter Gibson J was required to consider the nature of the 
relationship between the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn and the case law concerning 
the status of inspectors’ reports from Grosvenor to St Piran in the context of 
interlocutory proceedings in which the inspectors’ report from St Piran was exhibited 
by the plaintiff. His Lordship accepted that the rule in Hollington’s case remained a 
general principle of the common law and indicated that the winding up cases had 
established that the contents of such reports, being mere opinions, were inadmissible 
in the absence of the “statutory justification” under which the court could act upon 
them in winding up proceedings where they were not challenged.  
 
The implied exception: nature, development and scope (the directors 
disqualification cases) 
 
In Re Rex Williams Leisure Plc. (In Administration)
43
 concerned an application to the 
court, under section 8 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, by the 
Secretary of State, for the disqualification of two directors, the application following 
an investigation into the company’s affairs which the Secretary of State had 
authorised under section 447 of the Companies Act 1985. The evidence filed by the 
Secretary of State in support of the application included an affidavit sworn by the 
accountant who had carried out the section 447 investigation, the accountant 
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exhibiting notes of statements that had been made to him by directors and employees 
of the company. The company asserted that the notes of the interviews of the 
employees were inadmissible under the hearsay rule (the statements made by the 







, Sir Donald Nicholls V-C, having referred to ABC, Travel and 
Holiday Clubs, SBA Properties, Allied Produce, Koscot. Armvent and St Piran, 
regarded the analogy between a report prepared by inspectors who had been appointed 
under section 431 of the 1985 Act and explanations that had been collected under 
section 447 of the 1985 Act as “compelling”. In reaching his decision that the notes of 
the interviews of the employees were admissible, his Lordship recognised that where 
inspectors appointed under section 431 made a report under section 437, whilst one 
consequence of such a report might be the presentation of a winding up petition by the 
Secretary of State, another possible consequence might be the making of an 
application for a disqualification order thereby. In relation to the admissibility of the 
contents of such a report in directors disqualification proceedings, his Lordship was of 
the view that the approach that the courts had adopted in the context of winding up 
proceedings was equally applicable where an application for a disqualification order 
was founded on an inspectors’ report because in both cases the intention of Parliament 
must have been that the Secretary of State would be able to found the case that was 
presented in court upon the information in the report. In relation to the position where 
the Secretary of State, rather than relying on an inspectors’ report, relied on 
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information that had been obtained under section 447 of the 1985 Act, his Lordship 
indicated that Parliament had envisaged that the consequences relating to the use of 
information in an inspectors’ report and information obtained under section 447 
would be similar, his Lordship indicating that the court could distinguish between the 
“less formal and less elaborate” section 447 investigation and an investigation 
conducted by inspectors appointed under section 431 when determining the weight of 
the relevant information.  
 
When Rex Williams reached the Court of Appeal
46
, Hoffman LJ (with whose 
judgment the remainder of their Lordships agreed), held that the judgment of Sir 
Donald Nicholls at first instance had been “entirely right”. His Lordship (who also 
referred to Grosvenor and St Piran ) relied upon Koscot as having provided 
recognition of the fact that section 169(3) of the 1948 Act and its successors had 
“created an implied statutory exception to the hearsay rule”47 and upon Armvent as 
having made clear that where an inspectors’ report was challenged, the report 
continued to be admissible as prima face evidence under the implied exception. In 
relation to the submission, made on behalf of the Secretary of State, that if the implied 
exception applied to public interest petitions for winding up under section 124A of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 it should also apply to disqualification applications under section 
8 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, his Lordship agreed with the 
Vice Chancellor at first instance that the analogy was “a powerful one”. Moreover, 
whilst his Lordship accepted that disqualification applications and public interest 
petitions for winding up could be distinguished upon the basis that in the former 
context the Secretary of State was required to prove facts showing that the director 
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was unfit whereas in the latter context all that had to be established was that the 
winding up of the company was in the public interest, his Lordships view was that 
these were distinctions that went to the weight of the evidence rather than to its 
admissibility.  
 
In Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Ashcroft
48
, the Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry sought disqualification orders under section 7 of the Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986. The issue for the Court of Appeal was whether a 
judge had properly ordered that passages in an affidavit sworn by a liquidator be 
struck out, the relevant passages consisting of hearsay evidence. Millett LJ (with 
whom Hutchinson LJ and Hirst LJ agreed) held that the passages should not have 
been struck out. The Civil Evidence Act 1995 had not been in force at the time when 
the application was made and the basis of their Lordships’ decision (applying Rex 
Williams and Armvent) was that the “implied hearsay exception” was applicable. The 
judge at first instance had held that Rex Williams did not apply to applications under 
section 7 of the 1986 Act but only applied to applications under section 8, but the 
Court of Appeal held that no material distinction could be drawn between an 
application based on information gathered by the Secretary of State’s officials and an 
application based on information supplied to the Secretary of State by an office 
holder.  
 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Baker (No. 3) (Re Barings plc)
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concerned an application to strike out an originating summons in the context of 
directors disqualification proceedings, Evans-Lombe J being required to consider the 
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admissibility of hearsay evidence contained in the affidavit of Mr Taylor, an 
accountant whom the Secretary of State had instructed to collate information that was 
contained in a variety of documents. The documents included a report of the Banking 
Supervision Enquiry into the collapse of Barings, a report of inspectors appointed by 
the Ministry of Finance of Singapore and transcripts of interviews, on behalf of those 
bodies, of officers of the Barings group. The respondents submitted that the implied 
exception did not apply both because the information had not been provided by an 
office holder (i.e. Mr Taylor was not a liquidator, administrator or receiver) and 
because Mr Taylor had not obtained the information in the exercise of statutory 
powers. Evans-Lombe J, with reference to Rex Williams and Ashcroft), was of the 
view, in relation to the operation of the implied exception, that no valid distinction 
could be drawn between the role that Mr Taylor had performed and that performed by 
an office holder. In relation to the respondent’s second submission, his Lordship 
found nothing in the judgments in Rex Williams and Ashcroft which indicated that the 
courts had prescribed that only evidence that had been gathered in the exercise of 
statutory powers fell within the ambit of the implied exception. Thus, his Lordship 
held that the evidence upon which the Secretary of State relied was admissible. His 
Lordship recognised, however, that if the respondent challenged the Secretary of 
State’s evidence with direct evidence and the Secretary of State did not adduce direct 
evidence to back up the hearsay evidence, the Secretary of States case might be 
weakened or might even fail.  
 
In Re Barings plc and others Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Baker and 
others (No 5)
50
, Parker J, in the context of the directors disqualification proceedings to 
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which Evans-Lombe’s decision had also related, was required to consider both the 
admissibility of and, if admissible, the weight to be attributed to material in the report 
of the Banking Supervision Enquiry into the collapse of Barings and in the report of 
inspectors appointed by the Ministry of Finance of Singapore. His Lordship was not 
required to rule on the admissibility of evaluative judgments or express criticisms of 
the directors contained in these reports because the Secretary of State did not rely on 
them on the basis that the court was on a position to reach its own conclusions on the 
primary evidence. Thus, his Lordship only found it necessary to rule on the 
admissibility of pure hearsay statements (e.g. what witnesses had told the inquiries) 
and of findings of primary and secondary fact contained in the reports. His Lordship 
(with reference to Rex Williams, to Ashcroft and to the decision of Evans-Lombe that 
was considered immediately above) held that the implied exception did not only 
encompass “pure hearsay statements” but also encompassed findings of fact. His 
Lordship indicated, however, that it was for the court to determine the weight that 
should be attached to such evidence.  
 
In Baker v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
51
, an appeal against a 
disqualification order that Jonathan Parker J had made in Barings, the Court of 
Appeal did not find it necessary to expressly consider either the ambit of the implied 
exception or the case law via which the implied exception developed. In relation to 
Jonathan Parker J’s decision in Barings concerning the admissibility of the hearsay 
evidence and the findings of primary and secondary fact, however, Morritt LJ, 
delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, indicated that their Lordships did not 
doubt the validity of Jonathan Parker J’s conclusions.  
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 In Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Bairstow 
52
, Mr Bairstow, the former 
chairman and joint managing director of a company, brought unsuccessful 
proceedings for wrongful dismissal against the company, Mr Bairstow’s appeal being 
dismissed. The Secretary of State then sought a disqualification order against Mr 
Bairstow under section 8 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 and 
Pumfrey J ordered that neither the Secretary of State nor Mr Bairstow were entitled to 
challenge the findings made in the unfair dismissal proceedings, they both being 
bound thereby. The Court of Appeal, allowing Mr Bairstow’s appeal, held that the 
findings made by Nelson J in the wrongful dismissal proceedings were not admissible 
in the directors’ disqualification proceedings and it was not an abuse of process for 
Mr Bairstow to require the Secretary of State to relitigate the issues that had been 
determined in the wrongful dismissal proceedings. With regard to the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence in directors disqualification proceedings, Sir Andrew Morritt V-C 
(with whose judgment Potter LJ and Hale LJ agreed) recognised that evidence in civil 
proceedings could no longer be excluded on the ground that it was hearsay, his 
Lordship indicating that, so far as the admissibility of hearsay evidence is concerned, 
the conclusion of the Court of Appeal in Rex Williams had been “overtaken” by the 
1995 Act. In relation to the operation of the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn, Sir 
Andrew recognised that the Court of Appeal in Hollington had ruled that the 
conviction was inadmissible both because the opinion of the criminal court was not 
relevant and because the evidence was hearsay evidence. Whilst Sir Andrew also 
recognised that the 1995 Act had made hearsay evidence generally admissible in civil 
proceedings, his Lordship held that the rule in Hollington’s case continued to be 
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authoritative. Thus, since counsel for the Secretary of State had accepted that no 
exceptions to the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn were applicable on the facts of 
Bairstow, his Lordship held that the findings and conclusions that Nelson J had made 
in the wrongful dismissal proceedings were not admissible in the directors 
disqualification proceedings.  
 
Finally, in Aaron itself, the issue before the Court of Appeal was whether material 
including findings and opinions in a Financial Services Authority’s report (which had 
been made under section 170 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 by 
investigators who had been appointed under sections 167 and 168 of the 2000 Act) 
and decisions made by the Financial Ombudsman Service were admissible for the 
Secretary of State in the context of directors disqualification proceedings which had 
been brought under section 7 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
The Financial Services Authority’s report included statements made to the 
investigators by witnesses, findings of fact that the investigators had made and the 
conclusions that the investigators had reached. Thomas LJ (with whose judgment 
Keane LJ and Buxton LJ agreed) recognised that it was common ground both that the 
statements that the witnesses had made to the investigators were admissible under the 
Civil Evidence Act 1995 and that the findings of fact and the conclusions that the 
investigators had reached would ordinarily be inadmissible under the rule in 
Hollington v Hewthorn. His Lordship held, however, that whilst the rule in 
Hollington’s case remained “a clear rule of evidence”, the findings and conclusions 
were admissible under the implied exception. In reaching this decision, his Lordship 
(with reference to the decisions in Travel and Holiday Club, Armvent and St Piran, 
which his Lordship regarded as having been approved in Rex Williams and Ashcroft, 
and having also considered the decisions of Evans-Lombe, Jonathan Parker J and the 
Court of Appeal in the Barings litigation) recognised that the implied exception had 
not merely operated as an exception to the rule against hearsay but, rather, that it also 
encompassed findings and opinions. His Lordship did not regard the decision of the 
Court of Appeal in Bairstow, which had concerned findings made in ordinary civil 
proceedings, as authority for the proposition that the implied exception was only an 
exception to the rule against hearsay. Thus, his Lordship regarded it as clearly 
established that an implied exception to the rules against hearsay and opinion 
evidence and to the rule in Hollington’s case existed in the context of disqualification 
proceedings, the basis of the implied exception being that: 
 
“…Parliament must have intended that a court should have regard to the 
materials produced under clear statutory procedures on which the Secretary of 
State had relied in bringing the proceedings.”53 
 
Whilst his Lordship recognised that the admissibility of hearsay evidence no longer 
depended upon the implied exception, his Lordship indicated that it remained 
necessary to rely on the implied exception, as an exception to the rule in Hollington’s 
case, in relation to findings of fact and conclusions. His Lordship, reaffirming the 
existence, scope and good sense of the implied exception, regarded the evidence that 
fell within the ambit of the implied exception as “plainly relevant” and indicated that 
it should be considered with the other evidence and given the weight that it deserved, 
it being “absurd to suggest” that the judge would “meekly follow” the investigators’ 
views. Thus, his Lordship, recognising that the statutory scheme had been 
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“broadened” to include provisions of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, 
upheld the decision at first instance that the Financial Services Authority’s report was 
admissible, though his Lordship recognised that the court might place “little, if any” 
weight on the report when determining contested issues and that the defendant would 
be entitled to assert that it would be unfair to rely on some or all of the report in the 
absence of other evidence.  
 
His Lordship then considered the admissibility of other materials, including the 
decisions made by the Financial Ombudsman Service. The Secretary of State 
submitted that this issue had been determined by the decisions of Evans Lombe J and 
Jonathan Parker J in the Barings litigation whereas the defendants submitted that the 
first instance decisions in Barings could not stand following the decision of the Court 
of Appeal in Bairstow. The Deputy Judge at first instance in Aaron had distinguished 
Bairstow on the basis that it concerned section 8 of the 1986 Act whereas Aaron 
concerned an application under section 7 of the 1986 Act for an order under section 6. 
Thomas LJ, however, with reference to Ashcroft, held that there was no reason to 
distinguish between these two sections and that the reasoning of the Deputy Judge 
had, thus, been incorrect. Moreover, his Lordship was not prepared to hold that 
material relied on by the Secretary of State that fell outside the statutory scheme was 
admissible in directors disqualification proceedings. Consequently, his Lordship held 
that the other materials that the Secretary of State had sought to rely on in Aaron did 
not fall within the ambit of the implied exception, though his Lordship also indicated 
that it was unnecessary for the parties to attempt to excise those parts of the 
documents that infringed the rule in Hollington’s case and did not fall within the 
ambit of the implied exception (i.e. those parts of the documents which contained 
findings as opposed to mere hearsay, which was admissible under the Civil Evidence 
Act 1995) as the trial judge would simply ignore the relevant parts. In relation to the 
material that had been admitted in Barings, his Lordship recognised that it was 
arguable that investigative reports produced by regulators or under statutory authority 
in other jurisdictions were admissible by analogy, his Lordship recognising that, in the 
absence of amendment of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, this was 
a matter that the court would have to determine when it arose.  
 
Conclusion  
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Aaron has confirmed that the implied statutory 
exception to the hearsay rule that developed in the context of winding up and directors 
disqualification cases continues to be of significance as an exception to the rule in 
Hollington v Hewthorn. Aaron’s case has also made clear, however, that the implied 
exception does not encompass every item of evidence evidence upon which the 
Secretary of State might wish to rely but, rather, only encompasses reports and 
materials produced under the statutory scheme that developed under the Companies 
Acts and which now, as the Court of Appeal in Aaron recognised, has been 
“broadened” to encompass provisions of the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000. This having been said, where evidence upon which the Secretary of State 
wishes to rely merely infringes the rule against hearsay and does not infringe the rule 
in Hollington’s case, recourse to the implied exception will be unnecessary as whether 
or not the evidence was produced under the statutory scheme, such evidence will still 
be admissible under section 1 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995, provided that it is 
relevant to an issue in the proceedings  
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